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ARTICLE
PETERS v. KIFF AND THE DEBATE ABOUT THE
STANDING OF WHITE DEFENDANTS TO
OBJECT TO THE EXCLUSION OF BLACK
JURORS AFTER BATSON: THE NONUSE AND
ABUSE OF PRECEDENT
STANTON D. KRAUSS*
In Batson v. Kentucky,' the Supreme Court held that the racially based
use of the prosecution's peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a
black defendant's jury violates the defendant's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 In addition, the Court
noted that "denying a person participation in jury service on account of
his race"' in this manner violates the excluded juror's rights under that
Clause. As might be expected, this decision has fueled the debate about
whether white defendants may complain when the State uses peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from their juries.4
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego; B.A. 1975, Yale University;
J.D. 1978, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Kathleen F. Brickey, Ronald M. Levin, Frank
W. Miller, and Karen L. Tokarz for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, requires the federal government to respect the same rights. See Boling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
3. 476 U.S. at 87.
4. This controversy began before Batson, see, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 281, 583
P.2d 748, 764 (1978); Castillo v. State, 466 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aft'd on other
grounds, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1986), but the more pressing issue at that time was whether a black
defendant could object to the State's use of its peremptories to exclude black jurors in his or her case.
Although Batson involved a black defendant, the Court extended its ruling to defendants belong-
ing to any "cognizable racial group" whose members are peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor
due to their race and (by implication) to the group members so removed from the jury. 476 U.S. at
96. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, I will
speak only of discrimination against black defendants and jurors. So, too, I will speak of the stand-
ing of white defendants to attack this discrimination, even though nonblack defendants need not be
white. See, e.g., Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (Oriental defendant attacking
use of prosecution's peremptories on black jurors).
Although I will speak of the standing of white defendants to object to discrimination against black
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One remarkable aspect of this post-Batson controversy has been the
way courts and commentators have treated Peters v. Kiff5 the only
Supreme Court decision actually to determine the standing of a white
defendant to protest discrimination against blacks in the selection of ju-
ries. More often than not, Peters has simply been ignored by courts con-
sidering this issue since Batson. Those exceptional opinions that do not
overlook it entirely display a truly breathtaking inability accurately to
report what the Justices said in that case. Nor has Peters fared much
better at the hands of the commentators.
There are two reasons why it is important to bring this situation to
light. One is doctrinal: Peters must somehow be rescued from this mo-
rass, and its bearing upon the standing of white defendants to contest the
use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors clarified. As a prac-
tical matter, this problem is pressing, because the Supreme Court will
address the standing question this Term in Holland v. Illinois.' The
other reason to examine Peters' fate, although not doctrinal in nature, is
no less important: it is only by studying this spectacle that we can hope
to learn what lessons it holds for our legal system and our profession.
With these twin goals of exposure and explication in mind, I begin by
introducing the reader to Batson and Peters. Once this has been accom-
plished, Part II of the Article surveys the treatment of Peters in the judi-
cial opinions and commentary discussing the standing question. In Part
III, I speculate about the reasons for the abuse that Peters has endured in
this context.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITICAL PRECEDENT:
Batson AND Peters
A. Batson v. Kentucky
Despite the Civil War Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 7
which makes the exclusion of any qualified citizen from a grand or petit
jurors, my research and analysis also include civil rights cases in which the standing of white plain-
tiffs to object to the defendant State's racially discriminatory use of its peremptories has been con-
tested. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986). The issue in these
cases is analytically indistinguishable from the issue in criminal cases with white defendants. How-
ever, the Article will not consider the standing of prosecutors to object to defendants' discriminatory
use of their peremptory challenges, as this issue may be subject to an extremely different type of
analysis. See, e.g., People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
5. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
6. 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989) (granting certiorari).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988)).
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jury in any state or federal court "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude"" a federal crime, the exclusion of black potential
jurors has remained a prominent feature of the American legal land-
scape. The Supreme Court has decried this situation for over a century,
but the Court has failed to put an end to it. In fact, the Court actually
licensed one potent form of racial jury-vetting in its 1965 decision in
Swain v. Alabama.9
Swain was the Court's first decision to consider a claim of discrimina-
tion in the selection of the petit jury, as opposed to the venires from
which grand and petit jurors are chosen. Given its belief in the impor-
tance of the unfettered use of peremptory challenges--challenges made
"without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to
the court's control"' 0 -, the Court held that peremptories may be used
to exclude black jurors because of their race whenever a prosecutor
thinks that would help win a case. At most, the Court allowed that the
Equal Protection Clause might forbid the systematic use of peremptory
challenges to lock blacks completely out of the criminal jury system."
Needless to say, Swain did nothing to stem the widespread disen-
franchisement of black jurors, 2 so the search was on for ways to sup-
plant it. Commentators advanced two different rationales for changing
the law. Some condemned Swain as an overly stingy reading of the
Equal Protection Clause and advocated its outright reversal.' 3 Others
urged courts to sidestep Swain by pronouncing the racially based use of
peremptory challenges offensive to the sixth amendment14 right, first rec-
ognized a decade after Swain, 5 to be tried by a jury drawn from a fair
8. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988).
9. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
10. Id. at 220. Prospective jurors who are actually or legally presumed to be biased may be
challenged for cause. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(c)
(1984).
11. See Krauss, Death-Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Missis-
sippi, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 507, 540 n.145 (1987).
12. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93; id. at 101 (White, J., concurring); id. at 103-04 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
13. See, e.g., Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 283-303
(1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985).
14. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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cross-section of the community. 16
The judicial response to these arguments was mixed. The Court ex-
pressed no interest in reconsidering Swain. A few lower courts accepted
"fair cross-section" arguments and forbade the State to exercise its per-
emptories on racial grounds, 7 but most refused to impose any restric-
tions upon the use of peremptory challenges in excess of those that Swain
required them to acknowledge.' 8
For a long time, the Supreme Court remained entirely above the fray.
Finally, five Justices broke their silence in 1983, when the Court denied
certiorari in a group of cases raising the issue of the constitutionality of
the use of these challenges to remove black jurors because of their race. 19
Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting from the Court's disposition
of these cases, made it clear that they would support a sixth amendment
attack upon Swain.2" Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, who cast
the deciding votes against hearing the cases, explained that they did so
because they wanted to see what they could learn by giving the lower
courts more time to experiment with regulating peremptory challenges.2
Two years later, this "study period" had ended,22 and the Court granted
certiorari in Batson.23
James K. Batson was charged with second-degree burglary and receiv-
ing stolen goods. Over Batson's objection, the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged all four blacks on the venire, and this black defendant was
tried before an all-white jury. After the Kentucky Supreme Court af-
firmed Batson's conviction on both counts,24 he sought relief from the
United States Supreme Court.
Speaking through Justice Powell, a seven-Justice majority reversed the
16. See, e.g., Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries,
86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n. 1. As the Batson Court noted, some of these decisions were predi-
cated upon state law or federal courts' supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts, rather than the sixth amendment.
18. See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867, 870-71 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
19. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
20. 461 U.S. at 963-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21. 461 U.S. at 961-63 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
22. It is not clear why the Court now found the issue ripe for consideration. In any event, the
substantive and procedural questions that troubled Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens in 1983
seem not to have been resolved in Batson.
23. 471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
24. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
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state court judgment. Although Batson pitched his argument in the
High Court on a sixth amendment theory, the Court chose not to pursue
this line of analysis. Instead, it elected to overrule Swain 25 and held that
a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors because of
their membership in a defendant's "cognizable racial group"2 6 violates
that defendant's right to the equal protection of the laws. Because the
Kentucky courts, consistent with Swain, had denied that the use of per-
emptories is subject to any such constitutional constraint, they had not
given Batson a chance to prove that the prosecutor had acted improperly
in his case. If, on remand, Batson showed that the selection of his jury
had been tainted, the Court declared that his conviction could not stand.
Much of Justice Powell's opinion is devoted to a discussion of how
such a violation may be proven.27 A defendant may make out a prima
facie case of the denial of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause,
the Justice explained, simply by showing that the prosecutor's conduct in
selecting the jury "raise[s] an inference" that the State's peremptories
had been used to exclude potential jurors on account of their membership
in the defendant's "cognizable racial group."2 Once the defendant es-
tablishes such a prima facie case, Justice Powell continued, the State
must articulate "neutral" reasons "related to the particular case to be
tried"2 9 for the jurors' exclusion. The burden then falls upon the defend-
ant to persuade the court that these reasons are pretextual, or his com-
plaint will fail.
Justice Powell also explained why a defendant who meets this burden
of proof has shown a violation of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. The reason our society values jury trials, he observed, is that we
trust that groups of lay persons selected from the community at large are
25. As I have explained elsewhere, see Krauss, supra note 11, at 540 n.147, the Court's insis-
tence in Batson that it was only revising an evidentiary component of its decision in Swain, see
Batson, 476 U.S at 89-98, was entirely disingenuous.
26. 476 U.S. at 96. This term is misleading. The Court's reference in this regard to Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977), indicates that it meant only that the defendant and the excluded
jurors must be members of "a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under
the laws, as written or as applied." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Castaneda held Mexican-Ameri-
cans to be a cognizable group, although they are not usually thought of as a distinct race. But see
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987); Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604 (1987).
27. Indeed, Justice Powell claimed merely to be altering an evidentiary component of the ruling
in Swain. See supra note 25.
28. 476 U.S. at 96-97.
29. Id. at 98.
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more likely than judges "to prevent oppression by the Government. 30
But keeping members of a defendant's "cognizable racial group" off the
jury due to their race, Justice Powell suggested, compromises the jury's
ability to protect the defendant against racial prejudice.3 '
More broadly, however, Justice Powell noted that the State's racially
based exclusion of any juror from jury service violates the juror's right to
the equal protection of the laws.32 Indeed, he insisted that the goal of the
Batson decision itself was to "ensure that no citizen is disqualified from
jury service because of his race."'33 Given that prosecutors have never
limited their use of peremptories on the basis of jurors' race to prosecu-
tions in which the defendant and excluded jurors belong to the same
race,34 one need not have been psychic to see that the standing of defend-
ants of a different race to object to this practice would be a "live" issue in
the wake of Batson. This, in turn, would have suggested that the legal
community would thenceforth be paying much more attention to the
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Peters v. Kiff.
B. Peters v. Kiff
Dean R. Peters, who was indicted and convicted of burglary, alleged
that blacks were systematically excluded from the pool from which his
grand and petit juries were selected.35 Had Peters also been black, proof
30. Id. at 87 n.8 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 87.
33. Id. at 99. See also id. at 99 n.22.
34. The facts of Swain itself reflect the use of prosecutorial peremptories to exclude blacks from
criminal jury service generally-no black had ever served on any petit jury in Talladega County,
Alabama. See 380 U.S. 202, 231-41 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). There is ample evidence that
prosecutors did not stop using peremptory challenges to keep blacks off American juries after Swain.
See, eg., Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 187-88 (1989); Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing
the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 143. At least in part, prosecutors choose
to exclude blacks from juries in cases not involving minority defendants because they correctly per-
ceive blacks, as a group, to be more liberal, more hostile to the death penalty, and less authoritarian
or prosecution-prone, than other groups in our society. See, e.g., T. FINNICAL, STRATEGY AND
TACTICS IN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, A PROSECUTOR'S PER-
SPECTIVE 29, 31 (1985) (available at the Missouri Attorney General's Office); Alschuler, supra, at
187, 210; Pizzi, supra, at 99, 143. It is therefore important to note that these sociological generaliza-
tions cannot be considered racially "neutral" explanations for the use of peremptory challenges, as
they fly in the face of Batson's insistence that "[a] person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a
juror.'" 476 U.S. at 87 (citation omitted). To hold otherwise would be to render Batson a dead
letter.
35. Oddly enough, although the court of appeals initially suggested that an earlier decision be
[Vol. 68:103
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss1/8
THE NONUSE AND ABUSE OF PRECEDENT
of this charge would have led to the automatic reversal of his indictment
and his conviction under the Court's previous equal protection decisions.
But Peters was white, and so his appeal presented the Court with a ques-
tion of first impression: whether a white defendant may complain of the
racially based exclusion of blacks from his grand or petit jury venire.36
The issue was further complicated by a question of timing. Peters' trial
was held before Duncan v. Louisiana 3' recognized that people prosecuted
for serious crimes in state courts have a right to trial by jury. Thus, he
could not claim standing on the theory that the racially based peremp-
tory removal of black jurors is the equivalent of their exclusion from the
venire, which the Court would shortly pronounce barred by a sixth
amendment right to a trial jury drawn from a source fairly representative
of the community.38
Nonetheless, by a six-to-three vote, the Court ruled that neither Peters'
indictment nor his conviction could stand if he could prove his allega-
tions to be true. 39 No single rationale commanded a majority-or even a
plurality-of the Court. Justice Marshall, who spoke for Justices Doug-
las and Stewart as well, observed that he would have granted Peters
standing on a sixth amendment theory if only that amendment applied to
this case.' However, that theory was not available to Peters, and so
Justice Marshall went on to conclude that anyone indicted or convicted
by a jury from which "any large and identifiable segment of the commu-
regarded as having finally settled the discriminatory nature of the Muscogee County jury selection
system, Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731, 740 (5th Cir. 1968), it ultimately concluded that, while
Peters presented other evidence in support of his claim, he did not make a prima facie case of jury
discrimination. Peters v. Kiff, 491 F.2d 967, 968 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), the Court had found it unnecessary to
decide whether a male defendant could complain of a state's exemption from grand jury service of
women who did not volunteer to serve. Outside of the jury discrimination context, Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), had held that whites have standing to challenge the enforcement of restric-
tive covenants directed against nonwhites.
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (i968), decided that Duncan would not be applied retro-
actively. Three years after Peters, the Court found the sixth amendment right to jury trial to include
a right to a jury drawn from a source fairly representative of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Court has never ruled on the impact of the latter right upon the State's
freedom to exercise its peremptory challenges as it sees fit.
39. Even the three dissenters seemed to acknowledge that Peters would have had standing if the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community applied to
his case. See 407 U.S. at 510-11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
40. 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.). See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
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nity' 41 was unconstitutionally excluded has been denied due process of
law.42 Because the jury selection system described by Peters would vio-
late the excluded jurors' right to equal protection, and because blacks are
a "large and identifiable segment of the community," these Justices held
that the Due Process Clause gave Peters standing to object to the jurors'
exclusion. In an opinion by Justice White, a second trio of Justices-
White, Brennan, and Powell-decided that Peters had standing to com-
plain of the violation of the excluded grand jurors' rights because that
would best comport with "the strong statutory policy" of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. 43
Neither of these three-Justice blocs found it necessary to consider the
other's rationale. Likewise, neither addressed Peters' claim that allowing
blacks, but not whites, to protest the exclusion of blacks from the jury
pool violates the white defendants' right to the equal protection of the
laws." The Court has never corrected either omission, and Peters re-
mains the only Supreme Court decision addressing the standing of white
defendants to challenge discrimination against black jurors outside of the
sixth amendment context."a Indeed, because none of the Court's "fair
cross-section" decisions has involved racially based exclusions,46 Peters is
the Court's only decision that actually rules on a white defendant's
standing to protest the State's attempts to limit the participation of racial
minorities on its grand or petit juries.
41. Id. at 503.
42. The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. An analogous provision of the fifth amendment applies to the federal government.
43. 407 U.S. at 507 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
44. See Brief of Petitioner 16-19, Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (No. 71-5078). The dis-
senting Justices evidently rejected this claim because they regarded prejudice as essential to the exist-
ence of an equal protection claim and doubted that the exclusion of blacks from Peters' grand and
petit juries prejudiced him. See 407 U.S. at 508-10 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. The sixth amendment governs the selection of petit juries only.
46. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979),
involved the exclusion of women from petit juries. The Court's only other "fair cross-section" deci-
sion, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), involved the exclusion for cause of venire members
whose opposition to capital punishment rendered them unfit to serve in the death sentencing phase,
but not the guilt/innocence phase, of a capital case. Last Term, the Court heard oral arguments on
whether the "fair cross-section" rule bars the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to keep
blacks off a black defendant's jury, but it disposed of the case without ruling on the matter. Teague
v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
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II. Peters AND THE STANDING ISSUE AFTER Batson: A SURVEY OF
THE COURT DECISIONS AND COMMENTARY
Despite its obvious relevance to the question whether, in light of Bat-
son, white defendants may challenge the State's use of peremptory strikes
to keep blacks off of their petit juries,4 7 Peters is usually unmentioned in
the reported decisions examining this issue. When not ignored, or cited
for another purpose, it is generally miscited or cavalierly distinguished
by the courts. And the performance of the commentators has not been
much better.
I have found a total of fifty-one reported post-Batson decisions discuss-
ing the standing question. They come from sixteen states and seven fed-
eral circuits.48 In seven of these decisions, the issue is disposed of with a
47. Given the evident, albeit surprising, confusion about Peters' relevance to the question men-
tioned in the text, it may be helpful to summarize the Peters-based standing argument at this point.
See also infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. This analysis would run as follows: If, as Justice
Marshall asserted in Peters, a white defendant's right to due process is violated by the unconstitu-
tional exclusion of blacks from his jury, that result should equally obtain whether the exclusion
occurs in the selection of the venire or the petit jury. On the other hand, if "the strong statutory
policy" of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 requires that white defendants be granted standing to object
to the racially based exclusion of blacks from the venires from which their grand juries are chosen, as
Justice White maintained in Peters, a similar result should obtain in this context. After all, the Civil
Rights Act bars the racially based exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries, and without
regard to the procedural device by which their exclusion is carried out.
48. United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 314 (1988);
United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163
(8th Cir. 1988) (white plaintiff challenging State's use of peremptories against black jurors in civil
§ 1983 case); United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Town-
sley, 843 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 856 F.2d 1189 (1988); United States v.
Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987); Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(dictum); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); Clark
v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (white plaintiff challenging State's use of
peremptories against black jurors in civil § 1983 case); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D.
Conn. 1986) (white plaintiff challenging State's use of peremptories against black jurors in civil
§ 1983 case); Smith v. State, 515 So. 2d 149 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Superior Court, 157
Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988); State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 512, 753 P.2d 1168 (Ct. App.
1987), aff'd, 157 Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987) (Span-
ish-surnamed jurors, nongroup member defendant); Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989);
Torres v. State, 541 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (question certified to Florida Supreme
Court); Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 546 So. 2d 710 (1989); Moon
v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 375 S.E.2d 442 (1988); Pruitt v. State, 258 Ga. 583, 373 S.E.2d 192 (1988);
Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 364 S.E.2d 835 (1988); Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 345 S.E.2d 831
(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987); McGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 363 S.E.2d 850
(1987); Heaton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 718, 350 S.E.2d 480 (1986); People v. Rivera, 176 IIl. App. 3d
781, 531 N.E.2d 372 (1988); People v. Rivera, 160 Ill. App. 3d 214, 513 N.E.2d 584 (1987); People v.
Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397, 511 N.E.2d 1361 (1987); People v. Zayas, 159 Ill. App. 3d 554, 510
N.E.2d 1125 (1987); People v. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109
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simple citation to governing precedent.49 In only nineteen is Peters even
cited. °
S.Ct. 1309 (1989); State v. Lynch, 512 So. 2d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Wagster, 489 So, 2d
1299 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1989); Chew v. State, 71
Md. App. 681, 689-94, 710-17, 527 A.2d 332, 336-38, 347-50 (Ct. Spec. App.) (dictum), cert.
granted, 311 Md. 301, 534 A.2d 369 (1987); Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078 (Miss. 1987), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 2458 (1989); State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (dictum),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989); State v. Bruce, 745 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State V.
Bolanos, 743 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hamilton, 740 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App,
1987); State v. Smith, 737 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1311 (1989);
State v. Christensen, 720 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 536 n.9,
511 A.2d 1150, 1164 n.9 (1986) (dictum); State v. Hall, 107 N.M. 17, 751 P.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Podborny, 41 Ohio App. 3d 135, 534 N.E.2d 926 (1987); Nguyen v. State, 769 P.2d 167
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3264 (1989); State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632 (R.I.
1989); State v. Chakouian, 537 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1988) (dictum); Castillo v. State, 761 S.W.2d 495
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Mead v. State, 759 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Seubert v. State, 749
S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (petition for review granted); Easter v. State, 740 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (black defendant, Hispanic jurors); Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (Oriental defendant, black jurors); Catley v. State, 726 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (black
defendant, "minority" jurors).
I exclude from this group of cases the inscrutable Cash v. State, 507 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (per curiam), the opinion in which reads, in its entirety, "Affirmed on the authority of
Batson v. Kentucky, _ U.S.., 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1086), Neil v. State, 457 So. 2d 481
(Fla. 1984), Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), and section 775.087(b), Florida
Statutes (1985)."
I also exclude Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), in which the Second Circuit merely
reaffirmed the sixth amendment theory that it had adopted before Batson.
It bears noting that the issue of a white defendant's standing to object to the exclusion of black
jurors in light of the Batson decision has largely been moot in those jurisdictions which had previ-
ously held that the "fair cross-section" theory limits the State's use of its peremptories. See, e.g.,
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 281, 583 P.2d 748, 764 (1978); cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975) (male defendant has standing under sixth amendment to challenge exclusion of women
from venire). The exception is Florida, where the supreme court only recently decided that white
defendants have such standing under that State's "fair cross-section" theory. See Kibler v. State, 546
So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989).
49. Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 754, 375 S.E.2d 442, 448 (1988); Pruitt v. State, 258 Ga. 583,
587, 373 S.E.2d 192, 197 (1988); Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 805, 364 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1988);
MeGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 237, 363 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1987); Heaton v. State, 180 Ga. App.
718, 719, 350 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1986); People v. Rivera, 176 Ill. App. 781, 7-, 531 N.E.2d 372, 377
(1988); People v. Rivera, 160 111. App. 214, 216-17, 513 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1987); State v. Bruce, 745
S.W.2d 696, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
50. United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988); id. at 1193 n.2 (Henley, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1084 n.16 (8th Cir. 1988); Lindsey v. Smith,
820 F.2d 1137, 1146 (11th Cir. 1987); State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541, 543-46, 760 P.2d 541,
543-46 (1988); State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 512, 514-15, 753 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 (Ct. App.
1987); id. at 516, 753 P.2d at 1172 (Shelley, J., dissenting); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153
(Colo. 1987); Torres v. State, 541 So. 2d 1224, 1225-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kibler v. State,
546 So. 2d 710, 711-12 (Fla. 1989); Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(Orfinger, J., concurring); McGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 239, 363 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1987)
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Yet this figure overstates Peters' impact on this debate. Five of these
nineteen cases cite Peters in other contexts. In one instance, the reference
to Peters consists of a quotation of the following language from Justice
Marshall's opinion: "The exclusion of [blacks] from jury service, like the
arbitrary exclusion of any well-defined class of citizens, offends a number
of related constitutional values."'" In another case, the court errone-
ously includes Peters in a list of cases said to have "repeated" an earlier
Supreme Court decision's "language" declaring the fair cross-section
principle a part of our tradition that cannot be breached without disre-
specting our basic values. 2 A third decision quotes Justice Marshall's
opinion in commenting that "the focus [of sixth amendment jurispru-
dence] is primarily on guaranteeing that juries are selected in such a
manner as to permit 'a fair possibility for obtaining a representative
cross-section of the community.' "5 A fourth cites Peters as authority
for allowing a white defendant to challenge the systematic use of per-
emptories to exclude blacks from serving on criminal juries, but fails to
mention it in denying the defendants standing to challenge the State's use
of peremptories to remove black jurors in his case. 4 Finally, in deciding
whether a black defendant "has standing to raise a Batson challenge"
when his jury included five blacks, State v. Vincent55 states that the Jus-
tices noted in Peters that the Court's previous equal protection decisions
"had been brought under the single analytical umbrella of the defend-
ant's right to equal protection" and that the Court did not expand the
scope of that Clause's coverage in Batson. 6
(Beasley, J., dissenting in part); People v. Holland, 121 I1. 2d 136, 184, 520 N.E.2d 270, 292 (1987)
(Simon, J., dissenting); State v. Wagster, 489 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 417, 554 A.2d 1203, 1210 (1989); id. at 427-38, 544 A.2d at 1215-20 (Eldrige,
J., dissenting); State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (dictum), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3155 (1989); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 526, 536, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159, 1165 (1986); State
v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 633-34 (R.I. 1989); Mead v. State, 759 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988); Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585, 586-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (petition for review granted);
Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
51. Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d at 1146 (quoting Peters, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972) (opinion of
Marshall, J.)).
52. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 525-26, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159 (1986). In fact, none of the
decisions cited in the list "repeated" this "language".
53. Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Peters, 407 U.S. at 500,
quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
54. See State v. Wagster, 489 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
55. 755 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155 (1989).
56. 755 S.W.2d at 403 (emphasis in original). The court saw the question before it as turning
upon whose rights Batson was meant to protect. The fact that there were five blacks on the jury
would be irrelevant, according to the court, if other jurors had been challenged discriminatorily and
1990]
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Of the remaining fourteen cases, only two so much as suggest the argu-
ment-based on Justice White's opinion in Peters-that a white defend-
ant may have standing to make a Batson claim under the Civil Rights
Act of 1875. In United States v. Townsley,57 an Eighth Circuit panel
ruled that white defendants being tried with a black codefendant could
share in his Batson claim. The panel's sole reference to Peters is in a
footnote saying that, because the defendants made only an equal protec-
tion argument on appeal, "[w]e express no opinion on any due process or
statutory argument [the defendants] may have. See Peters v. Kiff.'"
The only other allusion in these cases to Justice White's theory of deci-
sion in Peters appears in a dissenting opinion in a Maryland case, State v.
Gorman.i9 In the sole remotely thorough analysis of the standing ques-
tion in the entire set of decisions, Judge Eldridge noted Justice White's
rationale and argued that it applies when a white defendant attacks the
racially based use of peremptory challenges to remove blacks from his
jury.6 ° The majority of the court ruled that the white defendant lacked
standing in this situation, but it did not even mention Justice White's
argument.
Justice Marshall's due process analysis has fared somewhat better in
these cases. It is cited in eight of them.61 One such reference, by the
if Batson was intended to allow defendants to vindicate jurors' rights. If Batson was designed to
protect the defendant's right to a jury from which his "cognizable racial group" had not been ex-
cluded, however, and if a sufficiently large number of group members remained on the jury despite
the State's discriminatory use of its peremptories, the court felt that the defendant would lack stand-
ing to make a claim under Batson. Having found that Peters had not expanded equal protection
analysis to allow defendants to assert jurors' rights under that Clause, the court read Batson as not
working this doctrinal expansion, and so it held that Vincent did not have "standing to raise a
Batson challenge." Id.
While the clear implication of this discussion, consistent with previous decisions of the Missouri
Appellate Court, see cases cited in note 47, supra, is that a white defendant would lack standing to
bring an equal protection claim under Batson, the court was silent about whether such a defendant
would have standing to complain under any other legal theory, such as the due process theory it
erroneously asserted the Court to have employed in Peters.
57. 843 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 856 F.2d 1189 (1988).
58. 843 F.2d at 1084 n.16 (citation omitted). When the case was reheard en bane, the defend-
ants added a sixth amendment standing argument in their briefs, but apparently not one based on
Peters. See 856 F.2d at 1190; id. at 1194 (Henley, J., dissenting). Therefore, when the full court
rejected the panel's decision, Peters was not mentioned.
59. 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1989).
60. 315 Md. at 430-31, 435, 554 A.2d at 1216-17, 1219 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
61. Although the matter is not crystal clear, neither State v. Wagster, 489 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct.
App. 1986), the case referred to in the text accompanying note 53, supra, nor United States v. Cha-
vez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1987), appears to belong in this category. In Wagster,
the court seems to have regarded the defendant's Batson claim as based on a sixth amendment
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Eighth Circuit panel in Townsley, has already been mentioned. 62  His
opinion was relied upon by Judge Eldridge in Gorman, and expressly
rejected by the majority of the court.63 It was invoked by dissenters, and
ignored by majorities, in two other cases.' It was cited and rejected
without dissent by the Texas Court of Appeals for the Second District in
Mead v. State65 and embraced as a basis for granting a white defendant
standing by the First District in Seubert v. State.66 Justice Marshall's
views were deemed strong authority in favor of granting a white defend-
ant standing by the Florida Supreme Court.67 Finally, they were held
dispositive with respect to this issue by the Arizona Court of Appeals.68
Perhaps more striking is the abuse that Peters has taken when courts
have acknowledged its existence. On the one hand, the case is almost
invariably miscited. The most common error committed by the courts
that discuss Peters' bearing upon this standing question is that an over-
whelming majority of them refer to Justice Marshall's opinion as the
opinion of the Court. 69 A second mistaken view of the case-that it is a
theory, and it did not cite Peters in this context. 489 So. 2d at 1303 n.2. While the opinion in
Chavez-Vernaza states (and rejects) the white defendant's claim that the State's peremptory chal-
lenge of black venire members in his case denied him due process of law, it never mentions Peters.
While this may have been an oversight on its part, I am inclined to doubt that it was. Chavez-
Vemaza was tried in the federal courts, and the Equal Protection Clause was therefore inapplicable
to his case. However, equal protection principles did apply, through the Due Process Clause of the
fifth amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Because the court neither mentions the
Equal Protection Clause, suggests that Chavez-Vernaza was invoking a different part of the Consti-
tution than the one construed in Batson, nor cites Peters or any other decision involving the four-
teenth amendment's Due Process Clause, it is likely that this case involved a Boiling-type due
process claim, not a Peters-type due process claim.
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63. 315 Md. at 417, 554 A.2d at 1210; 315 Md. at 427-31, 435, 554 A.2d at 1215-17, 1219
(Eldridge, J., dissenting).
64. See Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987) (Orfinger, J., concurring), rev'd,
546 So. 2d 710 (1989); McGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 239-41, 363 S.E.2d 850, 854-56 (1987)
(Beasley, J., dissenting in part).
65. 759 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
66. 749 S.W.2d 585, 586-88 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
67. See Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 1989).
68. See State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 512, 514-15, 753 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 (Ct. App. 1987),
aff'd, 157 Ariz. 541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988). The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed this decision on
sixth amendment grounds and, while citing Justice Marshall's opinion in Peters, the court did not
mention his Due Process Clause analysis.
69. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1146 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1327 (1989); State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. at 514-15, 753 P.2d at 1170-71; Fields v. People, 732
P.2d 1145, 1153 (Colo. 1987); Mead, 759 S.W.2d at 444; State v. Vincent, 755 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988); Seubert, 749 S.W.2d at 586-88. Cf. United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1193
n.2 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Henley, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall's opinion cited as "plurality
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sixth amendment decision-is also widely held.7° Nor has the Court
been entirely immune from this syndrome. Dissenting from the denial of
certiorari in a 1984 case involving the standing of a middle-aged black
defendant to challenge the underrepresentation of women and young
people on local grand juries, Justice Marshall incorrectly described his
own opinion in Peters as having been based on both the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses!7"
On the other hand, the explanations given for distinguishing Peters by
the three courts that have expressly rejected statutory or due process
standing arguments based thereon72 are just plain embarrassing. Mead
dismissed a defendant's due process argument under Peters because "the
right to a fair cross-section of the community [a different right] is limited
to the venire and may not be invoked to invalidate the use of peremptory
challenges." 73 A Florida appellate court baldly asserted that "the United
States Supreme Court in Batson has receded from its position in Pe-
ters."'74 Finally, Gorman states that Peters does not give a white defend-
ant standing to contest the peremptory challenge of both blacks on his
venire for this "reason":
Peters did not involve ... peremptory challenges. As [the court below]
points out, the case was decided on due process grounds because "Peters
decision"); Townsley, 843 F.2d at 1084 n.16 (single citation to pages in opinions of Justices White
and Marshall ends with parenthetical "(plurality opinion)"); State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. at
514, 753 P.2d at 1170 (citing this opinion as "plurality opinion"); Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 420-38, 554
A.2d 1203, 1212-21 (1989) (Elridge, J., dissenting). This phenomenon is doubtless related to the fact
that Justice White's ratio decidendi is so often overlooked in the cases.
70. See United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane); State v.
Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541, 544, 546, 760 P.2d 541, 544, 546 (1988); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d
1145, 1153 & n.15 (Colo. 1987); People v. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 184, 520 N.E.2d 270, 292 (1987)
(Simon, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 1309 (1989); State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 633 (R.I.
1989).
71. Ford v. Kentucky, 469 U.S. 984, 985 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). (Citing Ford, Judge Eldridge made the same mistake in Gorman, in addition to falsely assert-
ing that Justice Marshall had deemed Peters' claim a good one on the merits. See 315 Md. at 429,
554 A.2d at 1216. But see 407 U.S. at 505 (opinion of Marshall, J.).) Justice Marshall is also guilty
of calling his opinion in Peters a "plurality" opinion. Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 358
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Two other courts have rejected such arguments implicitly. See supra text accompanying
note 63. Only the Texas appellate court in Seubert, 749 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the
Florida Supreme Court in Kibler, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989)-which was actually decided on state
constitutional grounds-, and (apparently) the intermediate appellate court in Superior Court, 156
Ariz. 512, 753 P.2d 1168 (Ct. App. 1987), have found these arguments persuasive.
73. 759 S.W.2d at 444 (citation omitted).
74. Torres v. State, 541 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (question certified to
Florida Supreme Court).
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had been indicated [sic] by an illegally composed jury." We have noted
that Batson did not declare peremptory challenges per se unconstitutional.
Peters spoke in terms of "[i]llegal and unconstitutional jury selection proce-
dures . . ." and of "the exclusion from jury service of a substantial and
identifiable class of citizens."
7 5
While the commentators do a better job than the bench or bar of recol-
lecting that Peters exists, 76 they are not much more successful at report-
ing it correctly. Of the twenty-five law review pieces discussing the
standing question since Batson,7 7 nineteen cite Peters as a relevant case.78
75. 315 Md. at 429, 554 A.2d at 1210 (citation omitted). Similarly, Judge Shelley of the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals rejected the claim that Peters is controlling in this context on the ground that
"'peremptory challenges were not involved" in Peters. State v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. at 516, 753
P.2d at 1172 (Shelley, J., dissenting). In the same vein, the Rhode Island Supreme Court justified its
rejection of a Peters-based equal protection or sixth amendment standing argument simply by noting
that Justice Marshall's statement of his holding in Peters does not say that a white defendant has
standing to challenge the use of the State's peremptories. State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 634 (R.I.
1989).
76. I infer from the courts' failure to mention Peters-based statutory or due process claims in
such a large percentage of cases raising the standing question that counsel are rarely making these
arguments. See infra text accompanying note 82.
77. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436,
1447 (1987); Alschuler, supra note 34, at 183-95; Breck, Peremptory Strikes after Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 74 A.B.A.J. 54, 60 (April 1, 1988); Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 283 n.59 (1988); Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 820 n.74
(1989); Lindsay, Prosecutorial Abuse of Peremptory Challenges in Death Penalty Litigation: Some
Constitutional and Ethical Considerations, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71 (1985); Magid, Challenges to
Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 1081, 1095-1104 (1987); Mayfield, Batson and Groups Other Than Blacks: A Strict
Scrutiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377, 406-07 (1988); Pizzi, supra note 33, at 117; Polelle
& Hourihane, In Batson's Wake, BARRISTER 53, 53-54 (Summer 1988); Raphael, Discriminatory
Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293,
332, 342-48 (1989); Robinson, The Peremptory Challenge After Batson: Limits on the Prosecutor or
License to Discriminate?, 76 ILL. B.J. 620, 624 (1988); Sagawa, Batson v. Kentucky: Will it Keep
Women on the Jury?, 3 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 14, 46 (1988); Thompson, Fair and Impartial Jury -
Catch as Catch Can, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 191, 220 (1987); Uelmen, Striking Jurors Under Batson v.
Kentucky: Lessons from California, 2 CRIM. JUST. 2, 3-4 (Fall 1987); Note, Batson v. Kentucky:
Challenging the Use of the Peremptory Challenge, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 292, 295 (1988); Note,
Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 355, 361-63 & n.65 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Jury Discrimination and the Peremptory
Challenge for Cause, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 240 (1986); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Peremp-
tory Challenges Redefined, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 579, 595 (1988); Note, The Prosecutor's Right to
Object to a Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory Challenges, 93 DICK. L. REV. 143, 154 n.97 (1988);
Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Sixth Amendment Remedy in Equal Protection Clothes, 22 GONZ. L.
REV. 377, 389 (1986/87); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1214-15 (1987); Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and
State v. Gilmore" A Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
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However, these discussions are plagued by the same errors committed in
the judicial opinions. Only four of them mention Justice White's opin-
ion;7 9 most speak as if Justice Marshall had written for the Court.8 °
891, 957-58 (1988); Note, The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Kentucky, 31
ST. Louis U.L.J. 473, 503 (1987); Note, Challenging the Peremptory Challenge: Sixth Amendment
Implications of the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 547, 549 & n.21
(1989). I do not include in this list pieces purporting merely to catalogue the lower court decisions
on the question or discussions of the prosecution's standing to contest defendants' use of perempto-
ies, which raises somewhat different issues.
78. See Alschuler, supra note 77, at 1447; Alschuler, supra note 34, at 183, 186; Gobert, supra
note 77, at 283 n.59, 284 n.64; Goldwasser, supra note 76, at 820 n.74; Magid, supra note 77, at
1098-1100; Mayfield, supra note 77, at 406 n.178, 407 n.185; Polelle & Hourihane, supra note 77, at
54; Raphael, supra note 77, at 345; Robinson, supra note 77, at 624; Sagawa, supra note 77, at 46
n.216; Thompson, supra note 77, at 220; Uelmen, supra note 77, at 3-4; Note, Discrimination by the
Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 363 n.65
(1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Jury Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge for Cause, 20
CREIGHTON L. REV. 221, 240 n.174 (1986); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Peremptory Challenges
Redefined, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 579, 595 n.163 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and
Improved Peremptory Challenges, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1214 (1987); Note, The Civil Implications
of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore"7 A Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891, 904 & n.67, 958 & n.280 (1988); Note, The Death Knell of the
Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Kentucky, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 473, 503 nn.214, 215 (1987);
Note, Challenging the Peremptory Challenge: Sixth Amendment Implications of the Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 547, 549 n.21 (1989).
79. See Alschuler, supra note 34, at 183; Goldwasser, supra note 77, at 820 n.74; Uelmen, supra
note 77, at 4; Note, Challenging the Peremptory Challenge: Sixth Amendment Implications of the
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 547, 550 n.21. None of these
sources does complete justice to Justice White's opinion. Professor Alschuler fails to note that the
Civil Rights Act condemns discrimination in the selection of petit, as well as grand, jurors. This
error, together with his failure to note the relationship that Justice Marshall's opinion (which he
seems to misread as giving Peters standing to object only to the exclusion of blacks from his grand
jury) perceived between defendants' rights under the Due Process Clause and jurors' rights under the
Equal Protection Clause, may have led Professor Alschuler to suggest that Batson was decided on
equal protection grounds in order to get around Peters. See Alschuler, supra note 34, at 183, 186.
Although Professor Goldwasser says Justice White rejected Justice Marshall's due process analysis
in Peters, he did not even mention it. Dean Uelmen asserts that Justice White's opinion does not
provide a white defendant with standing to make out a claim under Batson. His sole justifications for
this claim seem to be the fact that Peters was not decided under the Equal Protection Clause (which
did, however, form the basis for the Civil Rights Act) and the unsupported suggestion that Peters is
limited to the exclusion of blacks from grand juries. Finally, while the student note emphasizes that
Justice White's opinion is not founded on the Equal Protection Clause, it does not seem to recognize
the statutory basis of Justice White's opinion, and so it does not appreciate the relevance of that
opinion to the standing question presently under consideration.
80. See Mayfield, supra note 77, at 406 n.178; Raphael, supra note 77, at 345; Robinson, supra
note 77, at 624; Thompson, supra note 77, at 220; Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory
Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 363 n.65 (1988); Note, Batson v.
Kentucky: Jury Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge for Cause, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV.
221, 240 n.174 (1986); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Peremptory Challenges Redefined, 64 DEN. U.L.
REV. 579, 586 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38
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Consequently, the literature generally misstates the legal basis for the
decision in Peters, and many commentators (like their judicial brethren)
actually claim it to be based on the fair cross-section rule of the sixth
amendment."1 Thus, even though commentators examining the standing
question raised by Batson appear to take Peters much more seriously, the
academic literature demonstrates the same confusion about its meaning
as the relevant judicial decisions.
III. THE FATE OF PETERS IN THE POST-BATSON
STANDING DEBATE: AN ANALYSIS
This record of neglect and abuse in the courts and academia cries out
for an explanation. In the paragraphs that follow, I will explore several
possibilities. In the end, I will identify the one that I believe to be the
most viable, and touch upon its broader implications for our legal system
and our profession.
Because Peters is not only the sole Supreme Court decision to rule on
the standing of white defendants to object to the State's exclusion of
black jurors, but a favorable one as well, one might expect defense coun-
sel to invoke it at every opportunity.8 2 Yet, judging by the deafening
HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1214 (1987); Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v.
Gilmore: A Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891,
905 n.67, 958 n.280 (1988); Note, The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 473, 503, nn.214, 215 (1987); Note, Challenging the Peremptory Chal-
lenge: Sixth Amendment Implications of the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 67 WASH.
U.L.Q. 547, 550 n.21 (1989) (citing Justice Marshall's opinion as Court's after noting no "Court"
existed).
81. With respect to the "sixth amendment error," see Alschuler, supra note 76, at 1447;
Sagawa, supra note 77, at 46; Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After
Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 363 n.65 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New
and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1214 (1987); Note, The Civil Implica-
tions of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further Look dt Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891, 904 & n.67, 958 & n.280 (1988); Note, The Death Knell of the
Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Kentucky, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 473, 503 & nn.214, 215 (1987).
See also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 10, § 21.2(c), at 709 n.17. On the other hand, one
leading treatise calls Peters an equal protection case, see JURYWORK 4-18 (E. Krauss & B. Bonora 2d
ed. 1989), and one of the law review pieces mentioned in the text seems to agree, see Thompson,
supra note 77, at 220. Cf. Polelle & Hourihane, supra note 77, at 54 ("the [Peters] Court held a white
defendant had standing to raise equal protection and due process claims for the exclusion of black
jurors").
82. It is worth noting that an argument based on Peters would not be inconsistent with or
preclude counsel from making any other arguments he or she might wish to make in support of a
standing claim.
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silence with respect to Peters in the reported cases, this seems not to be
happening. How is this possible?
It would make most sense for counsel (and the courts) to overlook
Peters if reliance upon it would be either unnecessary or implausible. But
neither of these premises even remotely approximates the truth.
Peters arguments could not reasonably be considered superfluous in
this context. Only six jurisdictions have allowed white defendants to
take advantage of Batson as a result of the litigation discussed in Part II
of this Article.8 3 While five of these six courts have done so pursuant to
their understanding of the fair cross-section principle,84 the signals ema-
nating from the Supreme Court do not augur well for its endorsement of
this position. On the contrary, the Court has gone out of its way in re-
cent years to manifest hostility to the notion that this principle has any
bearing upon the selection of petit juries at trial.85 Hence, even though
the sixth amendment argument has considerable intellectual appeal86 and
83. These are a federal district court in the district of Connecticut, Clark v. City of Bridgeport,
645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), and state courts in Arizona, State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz.
541, 760 P.2d 541 (1988), Colorado, Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987), Florida, Kibler v.
State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989), New Jersey, State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 536 n.9, 511 A.2d
1150, 1164 n.9 (1986) (dictum), and Texas, Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
Courts in several jurisdictions have left open the possibility that they might allow white defendants
to capitalize on Batson under a legal theory not available to the defendant in the case at bar. See
Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1145-46 (1Ith Cir. 1987); Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895, 899-900
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
84. The exception is Clark. It is also worth noting that these five courts did not all locate this
principle in the sixth amendment. The Florida and New Jersey Supreme Courts based their deci-
sions upon their state constitutions. The Colorado Supreme Court relied upon both the sixth amend-
ment and its counterpart in the Colorado constitution. The Arizona Supreme Court invoked only
the sixth amendment, but Seubert appears to have been based upon both the sixth amendment and
the Due Process Clause.
85. See Alschuler, supra note 77, at 1446-48; Alschuler, supra note 34, at 183-86. However, the
Court has not decided the question or disturbed lower court decisions to the contrary.
86. The Court's "fair cross-section" decisions have clearly established that a white defendant's
sixth amendment rights would be violated by the systematic exclusion of blacks from the venire from
which his jury was selected. As Justice Marshall has noted,
[t]he desired interaction of a cross-section of the community does not take place within the
venire; it is only effectuated by the jury that is selected and sworn to try the issues. The
systematic exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitu-
tional at any stage of the jury selection process. There is no point in taking elaborate steps
to ensure that Negroes are included on venires simply so they can then be struck because of
their race by a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Because Batson denies that any significant state interest is unduly imperiled by the modest steps it
took to regulate the State's peremptory challenge, see 476 U.S at 98-99, it follows that the State's
discriminatory use of its peremptories on black jurors should violate the sixth amendment, regard-
less of the defendant's race. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979).
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potentially broader ramifications than an argument based on Peters,8 7 its
acceptance by the Court can scarcely be deemed a sure thing.
The "implausibility" hypothesis appears equally to fly in the face of
reality. The idea that Peters' two rationes decidendi apply in this context
is anything but frivolous. There is no obvious reason why the timing of
the improper exclusion of black jurors should affect either its impact on
the legitimacy of the resulting jury or the policies underlying the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.8" Despite the widespread confusion caused by a pas-
sage in Castaneda v. Partida 89 regarding the prima facie equal protection
claim of a defendant who belongs to the group excluded from the jury
venire, the Court has not cast the slightest doubt on the correctness of
the holding in Peters or the validity of either of Peters' rationales in any
subsequent case. 90 Indeed, only by allowing white defendants to chal-
87. It is not clear which classes of jurors defendants who are not class members may seek to
protect against discriminatory exclusion under either theory. While the Court has never spelled out
just what groups are cognizable classes for sixth amendment purposes, see Krauss, The Witherspoon
Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 45 & n.184
(1986), it is clear beyond peradventure that women, blacks, and Mexican-Americans are. See Lock-
hart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-77 (1986). On the other hand, blacks are the only class that is
clearly cognizable under Peters, inasmuch as Justice White's rationale in that case applies only to the
type of discrimination barred by the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Although the Court has not indicated
how broadly it would construe this statute, cf. infra note 90, it could not plausibly construe it to
cover gender discrimination. Thus, a sixth amendment theory may have a wider reach than one
relying on Peters. This could be true even if the Court were to embrace Justice Marshall's ratio
decidendi, as his opinion in Peters does not address the question of which, if any, nonracial groups
may be excluded from a defendant's jury without violating his rights under the Due Process Clause.
(This opinion does argue that the exclusion of any protected group may not be deemed a harmless
error, Peters, 407 U.S. at 502-05 (opinion of Marshall, J.), but it never says what nonracial groups
are protected. At most, it obliquely hints that women may be such a group. See id. at 504 n.12.)
88. Indeed, there is no reason at all for a defendant's standing to depend on the timing of the
discrimination against black jurors. See supra note 86. The logic of the opinions delivered by Jus-
tices Marshall and White in Peters does not bar this result. Justice Marshall argued that the uncon-
stitutional exclusion of black grand or petit jurors could not be deemed harmless error in a case
involving a white defendant. This theory obviously requires that white defendants be granted stand-
ing to protest the State's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against black jurors. Although
Justice White spoke only of the invalidity of Peters' indictment, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 forbids
the discriminatory exclusion of black grand and petit jurors. Hence, the sanction of reversal would
seem at least as appropriate in this context as in Peters. Cf. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 267-77
(1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing conviction renders discrimination in grand jury selection
harmless error). But see State v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, at 17 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1988).
89. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). This passage reads as follows: "Thus, in order to show that an equal
protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show
that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifi-
able group to which he belongs." Id. at 494.
90. There was no question of the standing of the defendant in Castaneda-both the defendant
and the excluded jurors were Mexican-American-,and there is no reason to believe that the Court
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lenge the peremptory excusal of black jurors on account of their race
could the Court have any hope of achieving Batson's stated goal, "en-
sur[ing] that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his
race."
91
Of course, Batson also says that only a black defendant may make a
prima facie case of a denial of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause by relying "solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges [on black jurors] at [his] trial."92 But this
dictum, like the above-mentioned language in Castaneda, does not re-
duce the prima facie relevance of Peters to the standing of a white defend-
intended to consider or reject the equal protection claims of some hypothetical non-Mexican-Ameri-
can defendant. In any event, the availability of an equal protection claim is a different question from
the availability of another (be it due process or statutory) claim. Indeed, precisely this point was
made in a later case on racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons. Hobby v.
United States, 468 U.S. 339, 347 (1984). (Incidentally, Hobby's discussion of Peters contains not the
slightest hint that Peters is no longer good law. See 468 U.S. at 343-46.)
91. 476 U.S. at 99. Indeed, as Batson simply purported to be harmonizing the law regarding
racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges with the principles developed in cases
involving discrimination in the selection of the venire, id. at 92-98, it would be perverse for the Court
to deem the standing rules developed in the latter context inapplicable in the former.
Justice White's concurring opinion in Batson suggests that his view of what constitutes impermis-
sible racial discrimination in this context may be a narrower one: that the Constitution only bars the
peremptory exclusion of black jurors "on the assumption that no black juror could fairly judge a
black defendant." Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring). It is not clear that this is the right way to read
his opinion, because Batson was black and Justice White may simply have been expressing his views
on this subject only to the extent necessary for him to resolve the issue raised by this case. Indeed,
Justice White expressly noted that "[m]uch litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the
Court's equal protection holding today." Id. at 102. However, even if Justice White meant to reject
a broader conception of the rights of black jurors, he did not speak for the Court.
Justice Powell, who spoke for seven Justices, plainly shared Justice White's concern about the
removal of black jurors "on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply
because the defendant is black." 476 U.S. at 97. But he seems to have had a much broader concep-
tion of the extent of a black juror's rights under the Equal Protection Clause. This scope is revealed
most clearly in three passages in his opinion. First, there is the general statement that because "[a]
person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror,'. . . by denying a person participation in
jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminate[s] against the excluded
juror." Id. at 87 (citations omitted). Then there is his statement of Batson's goal, which appears
twice, both times in the sweeping language quoted in the text. Id. at 99 & n.22. A final, perhaps
more explicit, indication of the extent of Justice Powell's vision may be found in his pronouncement
that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to
consider the State's case against a black defendant." Id. at 89 (emphasis added). The use of the
word "or" in this context makes the most sense if the passage is read as repeating the lesson of the
earlier discussion, that the State violates a juror's right to equal protection whenever it challenges
him on account of his race. See also supra note 34.
92. 476 U.S. at 96.
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ant to complain of the State's racially based peremptory challenge of
black jurors at his trial. After all, Peters neither discussed nor deter-
mined a white defendant's rights under the Equal Protection Clause.93
Thus, only a heedless literalist could regard this language in Batson as
rendering a Peters claim frivolous.94 Even then, however, there are two
other compelling reasons why a literalist theory could not satisfactorily
account for Peters' fate. First, the literalist objection to the sixth amend-
ment standing argument appears to be much stronger, and yet the de-
fense bar (and the commentators) seem to be quite fond of "fair cross-
section" arguments." Second, and more important, the literalist hypoth-
esis would not explain the mischief worked by the courts and commenta-
tors-friend and foe of a liberal standing rule alike-when they do recall
Peters. Indeed, this phenomenon seems to render the "redundancy" and
"implausibility" theories fatally inelegant.96
If that were not enough to discredit these theories thoroughly, there is
more. The problems surrounding Peters did not commence with Batson
and are not limited to the question of white defendants' standing to make
a Batson claim. Thus, a few years before Batson, when the debate con-
cerning the standing of defendants to challenge discrimination against
members of other groups in the selection of grand jury forepersons was at
its height,97 many courts facing the issue ignored Justice White's opinion
and called Justice Marshall's the opinion of the Court,98 and Peters was
93. See supra text accompanying note 44. Moreover, the Court has never decided whether the
exclusion of grand or petit jurors belonging to a cognizable group violates the rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of a defendant who does not belong to the group.
94. In Torres v. State, 541 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (question certified to Florida
Supreme Court), and Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 546 So. 2d 710
(1989), the courts refer to a Peters argument and then deny a white defendant standing on the
ground that Batson imposes a "same race" requirement. As has already been noted, see supra text
accompanying note 74, Torres argues that Batson "receded" from Peters. But the court deemed the
issue serious enough to certify it to the state supreme court. The Kibler majority, on the other hand,
simply ignored the concurring judge's argument that a Peters claim is not foreclosed by the "same
class" language in Batson. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541, 544-46, 760 P.2d 541, 544-46 (1988); State
v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 412, 417-19, 554 A.2d 1203, 1208, 1210-11 (1989); State v. Bruce, 745
S.W.2d 696, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Magid, supra note 77; Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Sixth
Amendment Remedy in Equal Protection Clothes, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 377, 389 (1986/87).
96. For a discussion of elegant theories, see Thomas, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827.
97. This controversy reached the Supreme Court in Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339
(1984). The confusion about Peters' meaning and relevance to this question that prevailed in the
lower courts is noted in Magid, supra note 77, at 1099, 1100.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Coletta, 682 F.2d 820, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
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often described as an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. 99
Moreover, since Batson, courts have made the same kinds of mistakes
when considering issues other than white defendants' standing under
Batson to attack the State's race-based use of peremptory challenges
against black jurors." O In fact, due to its apparent inability to notice that
Peters is not inconsistent with Castaneda, at least one court now appears
to believe that it is no longer good law at all.t10
All of the errors in characterizing Peters point to what strikes me as
the real cause of its plight: sloppiness. How else can one account for the
fact that the courts and commentators say that Justice Marshall spoke
for the Court, when the syllabus in Peters says that "Mr. Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart, concluded
that . . . . " and "Marshall, J., announced the Court's judgment and
delivered an opinion, in which Douglas and Stewart, JJ., joined";1 2
when the lead opinion begins, "Mr. Justice Marshall announced the
judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Stewart join"; 03 and when the header at the top of every
page of this opinion in the United States Reports reads "Opinion of Mar-
shall, J."? How else can one explain the fact that Justice White's opinion
U.S. 1202 (1983); United States v. Musto, 540 F. Supp. 346, 352-53 (D.N.J. 1982); But see, e.g.,
United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 167 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cross, 708 F.2d 631,
633 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983).
99. See Magid, supra note 77, at 1099.
100. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (stating Justice Marshall's opinion
based on Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 390 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (citing
Justice Marshall's opinion as Court's); United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 649-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (citing Justice Marshall's opinion as Court's, asserting decision based on Due Process Clause
alone); United States ex rel. Yates v. Hardiman, 656 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (N.D. I11. 1987) (citing
Peters as authority for cognizability of blacks under sixth amendment "fair cross-section" rule).
Peters has also been ignored or abused in a series of cases considering the standing of male defend-
ants to attack the State's use of peremptory challenges to remove female jurors because of their
gender. See, e.g., Potts v. State, 376 S.E.2d 851, 856 (Ga. 1989); People v. Crowder, 161 I11. App. 3d
1009, 1013, 515 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1987); id. at 1027-28, 515 N.E.2d at 795-96 (Pincham, J., dissent-
ing); People v. Irizarry, 142 Misc. 2d 793, 812, 815, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 641, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
101. See Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 687-89 (6th Cir. 1988). In another case, an Eleventh
Circuit panel manifested a clear agreement with this view, but indicated that a previous, contrary,
decision of a different panel prevented it from acting upon its belief. See United States v. Holman,
680 F.2d 1340, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1982). Several other puzzled courts have said that these two
decisions appear inconsistent. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 680 F. Supp. 641, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); United States v. Abell, 552 F. Supp. 316, 319, 320 (D. Me. 1982). (A commentator has
declared that Peters was overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Lindsay, supra note
77, at 96 n.98, 98 n.107, 100 n.121.).
102. Peters, 407 U.S. at 493.
103. Id. at 494 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
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is so generally ignored, when all but one of the members of the Peters
majority who were still on the Court when Batson was decided joined
that opinion, and when Justices White and (until his retirement) Powell
were voters of whose support white defendants could by no means other-
wise have been certain, but whose support might well have seemed essen-
tial if a liberal standing rule were to prevail in the Supreme Court? How
else can one explain the numerous assertions that Peters is an equal pro-
tection or sixth amendment decision, when Justice Marshall's opinion
explicitly noted that the sixth amendment did not apply in that case and
that Peters' equal protection claim would not be considered, "o and when
each of the opinions supporting the Court's judgment identified the legal
basis for its position in the plainest imaginable language?
This theory could also explain Peters' absence from so many of the
cases considering the standing question. Recently, in an unreported deci-
sion, an Ohio court faced with this standing issue refused to follow Pe-
ters, basically because it "neither addressed nor determined" the question
of standing under Batson and because the court found Peters confusing,
"there being no clear majority decision. '"105 If the criminal defense bar
shares this court's misplaced substitution of myopic literalism for legal
reasoning (and the fact that other courts are doing the same thing sug-
gests that this may be true) or its unjustified mystification about Peters
(and the general confusion surrounding Peters suggests that it might)
these lawyers may find it necessary, or at least easier, to ignore Peters
altogether and rely on other standing theories.1
0 6
I do not claim that Peters' fate is exclusively attributable to sloppy
reading and sloppy analysis. The chaos surrounding Peters is surely
magnified because of the general disarray of law governing jury selection,
in which the Justices have recognized claims under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, the fair cross-section principle, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, but have not explained the relationship between
these legal rules. The confusion is doubtless amplified to a still greater
extent because of the slavish literalism with which the Supreme Court
104. Id. at 497 n.5, 500. But see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
105. State v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, at 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1988).
106. That would leave the question why Peters is more often noted in the commentary than the
cases. Perhaps it is felt to be less inappropriate to mention a puzzling decision in a scholarly piece
than an advocacy piece. Or maybe academics have more time to try to "work things out", or more
interest in doing so. Finally, academics may be good at collecting cases relating to any given legal
problem, but not overly interested in the doctrinal complexities generated by Peters. See infra note
108.
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has interpreted many of its own precedents in recent years.1"' Indeed,
some of the judicial mistreatment of Peters may be attributable to judges'
ideological opposition to the rule announced in that case.
But still, much of this situation can only be chalked up to sloppiness,
and this raises some alarming questions about how well our legal system
works. If the bench and bar cannot distinguish a majority opinion from
a nonmajority opinion in a case in which a defendant's life may depend
upon the resolution of the standing question, what does this portend for
the more typical, lower-profile cases, or those in which the relevant deci-
sions or legal rules are truly difficult to comprehend? If commentators,
who should have the time, the ability, and the objectivity to make these
kinds of distinctions in their published work, fail to do so, what does this
portend for the training of the lawyers of tomorrow?10
8
IV. EPILOGUE
Although the Supreme Court is obviously not responsible for the
larger problems adverted to above, the Justices can eliminate the mess
surrounding Peters with a stroke of the pen. Holland v. Illinois gives
them the opportunity to clarify the relationship between the constitu-
tional rules (for these purposes I include the Civil Rights Act of 1875
among their number) governing jury selection and to determine the im-
pact of Peters on the standing of white defendants to attack the use of
peremptory challenges on black jurors because of their race. Unless the
Court accepts Holland's argument that the sixth amendment gives him
standing to contest the State's peremptory challenge of the only blacks
on his venire-and it seems unlikely that it will ° 9-the Court should
seize this opportunity to (at the very least) remind us that Peters lives. 10
107. Professor Alschuler has commented on this tendency in the Supreme Court's opinions and
its effects on the lower courts. See Alschuler, supra note 34, at 180 & n.107.
108. Quaere whether the commentators' failure to give an accurate account of what the Justices
said in Peters is related to the fact, which has been noted by Professor Alschuler, among others, see
Alshuler, supra note 77, at 1451, that doctrinal scholarship is commonly accorded little prestige in
the academic community.
109. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
110. Although a Peters argument would fall within the scope of the "question presented" in
Holland's petition for certiorari, see 44 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4192-93 (Mar. 8, 1989), Holland does
not, make such an argument in his Supreme Court brief. A similar omission did not prevent the
Court from deciding Batson on equal protection grounds, even though the "question presented" in
that case was confined to the legitimacy of the State's racially based use of peremptory challenges
under the sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community. See 476 U.S. at 84 n.4; id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., concurring);
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[As this Article went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). As the Article
anticipated, Holland held that the sixth amendment does not bar the
race-based use of the State's peremptory challenges. The Justices also
heeded the Article's call to emphasize the fact that white defendants
may nonetheless have a legal basis for challenging the State's discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges on black jurors. Such an admo-
nition may be found in every opinion delivered in the case. In fact,
five Justices indicated that they would have voted to allow Holland to
challenge the removal of the black venire members in his case if only
he had relied upon another legal theory. Id. at 811-12 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 812-14 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 821-22
(Stevens, J., dissenting). These Justices focused on considerations of
policy, including the notion that the State should not be able to violate
the right of blackjurors to the equal protection of the laws with impu-
nity, and they did not dwell on doctrinal niceties of the kind discussed
in this Article. Thus, it is hardly suprising that Peters is unmentioned
in any of the opinions handed down in Holland, or that none of them
purports to contain a careful marshalling of the precedents on the
standing question.]
id. at 112-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). However, it did so because the State of Kentucky urged it to
decide Batson under the Equal Protection Clause, and the issue was extensively briefed. See 476 U.S.
at 84 n.4; id. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., concurring). Neither condition obtains with respect to a Peters
argument in Holland. Still, even if the Court were to feel that the matter (which has never been
raised in the case) is not properly before it, it could nonetheless say something about Peters in Hol-
land. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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